Abstract
The thesis of my article, ‘Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation’ (Inquiry, Vol. 7 [1964], No. 4), was that Wittgenstein solved some early problems with a picture theory of language. The solution assumed that the units of language are words which are names of simple objects. Its undesirable consequences are exposed in my ‘Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914–1916’ (Inquiry, Vol. 12 [1969], No. 3). Because of these consequences Wittgenstein was led to analyze the idea of a name. This analysis, together with a new philosophic method, was developed in The Blue and Brown Books and the Investigations. The present article concerns this development and supports a theme of the first article that there was a central tendency in all Wittgenstein's work: radical empiricism.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
