Wittgenstein’s Movements of Thought and the Socratic Tradition of Philosophy

Abstract

By situating Wittgenstein's handwritten manuscripts in the Socratic tradition of philosophy, I argue that contrary to Wittgenstein's misjudgement about the role and impact of the Socratic conception of philosophy, his own way of doing philosophy has much in common with that of philosophers in the Socratic tradition in terms of orientation and rhetorical style. Focusing on Movements of Thought, the latest edition of Wittgenstein's Koder Diaries, I argue that the convergence of philosophical and personal remarks in Wittgenstein's handwritten manuscripts is the result of writing in the form of hypomnemata or private notes or exhortations to the self with the intention of capturing the movements of thought and working on oneself. Reading the Socratic dialogues, one has the feeling: what a frightful waste of time! What's the point of these arguments that prove nothing & clarify nothing. (Wittgenstein 1980: 14; 1998: 21)