Wittgenstein's Conception of a Criterion

Abstract

O NE of the key words in the vocabulary of Ludwig Wittgenstein is criterion. He gives this word a somewhat different meaning from that which is usual in ordinary philosophical discourse, although his special use is obviously derived from everyday usage. His conception of a criterion is the pivot upon which turn his theory of the nature of descriptive language, his claim that certain seeming assertions are meaningless, his view of the nature of philosophical questions, and his rejection of the view that empirical knowledge rests ultimately upon private sensations. Obviously, one cannot really understand the philosophy of Wittgenstein until one has grasped the special sense in which he uses the term criterion. In addition, many of the philosophers who have been influenced by him have adopted and extended his use of the term. Thus it is doubly important that his conception of a criterion be clearly understood. There have been at least two attempts to explain this conception, each helpful in its own way. Norman Malcolm indicates clearly the core of this conception.1 Unfortunately, he is so faithful to the language of Wittgenstein that he leaves obscure exactly what is obscure in the original. Rogers Albritton does not hesitate to torture the original language in an effort to translate its meaning into more precise terms.2 In this process of translation, however, he loses sight of the fundamental unity in Wittgenstein's view. Therefore, I should like to make a third attempt at explanation which will, I hope, clarify a little more than Malcolm's and torture a little less than Albritton's. Wittgenstein's writings have a tendency to be as difficult to interpret as they are suggestive to read. Even a careful study of the