Abstract

This paper is an attempt to offer a Wittgensteinian critique of platonic universals, abstract objects which Plato took to be: (1) the essential elements of particulars, and (2) the meanings of general words. I will first offer an interpretation of Plato from the dialogues «Republic», «Phaedo» and «Theaetetus», and then identify specific assumptions contained within this metaphysical doctrine which concern, first, the concepts of meaning and understanding; and, second, the claim of essentialism for particulars. I will then discuss criticisms of this view from a Wittgensteinian perspective. The concepts of surface grammar and depth grammar in the «Investigations» will be discussed, and I will then apply these concepts to the theory of forms to offer a econd critique from this perspective

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