Wittgenstein on ‘Grammatical’ and ‘Metaphysical’ Propositions

Abstract

A main source of philosophical puzzlement, according to Wittgenstein, is that we do not command a clear view of the ways in which we use language: ‘A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. – Our grammar is deficient in surveyability.’ (PI §122) This is not to say that language, as such, is in need of greater surveyability. Wittgenstein’s grammatical reminders are directed at those who attempt to move around reflectively in language, people in philosophy, for the most part. He reacts to what struck him as peculiar in what philosophers say. They say things that in his view are born of a misconception about philosophical discourse itself. He approaches philosophical problems in the way he does after having found that he had said such things himself. Wittgenstein is, in this respect, very much a philosopher of philosophy, struck by what philosophers say and what may tempt them to say it. One expression of this misconception is the ‘metaphysical use of words’, or the use of ‘metaphysical propositions’, as he calls it (cf. PG: 128, 130, BB: 55, PI §58b).