WITTGENSTEIN, FAMILY RESEMBLANCES AND THE THEORY OF CLASSIFICATION

Abstract

Recently there has been much discussion of the relevance to sociology of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In this discussion, reference has been made to Wittgenstein's remarks on classification. For instance, Dutton writes “After Wittgenstein, we might say that the category of acts which may be labelled criminal (or deviant) is the category: “any” acts”. (Ditton, 1979, p. 20). According to Hughes, “Wittgenstein uses the term “family resemblances” to make the point that states of affairs falling under a common term, such as ‘games’ show overlapping similarities and resemblances rather than universal, finitely specifiable common properties”. (1977, p. 72). However, the philosophical importance of Wittgenstein's remarks and their relevance to the concerns of the sociologist have not been fully explored. What precisely is Wittgenstein thought to be asserting and denying with his observations about games? After all, on the face of it, it hardly seems controversial or interesting to say that games resemble each other. It has been argued, most notably by Bambrough, that Wittgenstein's remarks are directed towards “the problem of universals”.