Wittgenstein emotions, state of consciousness language games

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to consider some grammatical criteria that Wittgenstein considers for understanding the psychological concepts of emotion and state of consciousness. The analysis shows that Wittgenstein uses criteria and patterns to distinguish emotions and states of consciousness in language games and their relation to life forms. Psychological concepts have a grammar depending on the actions and life of human beings and it is necessary to follow to avoid misunderstandings. By making a reflection on psychological concepts it is shown that the expression of emotions is linked to external criteria that Wittgenstein enunciates in a way that helps to clarify difficulties and with them he shows that what is in the mind is relevant if it can to talk about emotions if it can be put into a language. Throughout the text there is an emphasis on the concept of dispositional emotion and detailed implications that it has on the language games where emotions are expressed. It is also shown succinctly that, in the language games related to emotions, there are criteria related to the uses and actions that prevent emotional language from being affected by skepticism