Wittgenstein, Biography, and Religious Identity

Abstract

It might seem obvious that the philosopher, while perhaps intrigued by details of biography or history, need not consult these disciplines when doing philosophy. After all, the validity of an argument is not affected by who asserted it and what he or she was really like as a person. To suggest otherwise invites concern that an interpreter may be committing an ad hominem fallacy or may be otherwise losing track of the important things — claims and reasons. The view just described is common sense, but like all sensible principles, it admits of exceptions, or so I argue. For many philosophers and on many topics, knowing their biographical details or historical context is strictly speaking irrelevant to understanding their philosophical achievements, but for Wittgenstein and the topics of religion and the nature of philosophy, this is not so. The reasons why are because for Wittgenstein, philosophy was a personal practice as much as an academic discipline, something that can be readily seen in biographies; and because the fragmentary and enigmatic remarks on religion, typically coming from sources that were not prepared for publication, can be better appreciated against the background of Wittgenstein’s life. This chapter argues for a pair of claims regarding the use of biography and historical-contextual study for interpreting Wittgenstein’s philosophy.KeywordsJewish IdentityReligious IdentityJewish PeoplePhilosophical PracticeReligious PhenomenonThese keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.