Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind

Abstract

The status of Wittgenstein’s work in contemporary philosophy of mind is peculiar. While few philosophers of mind would deny that Wittgenstein had at least some helpful things to say concerning philosophical questions about the mind—some clever ways of undermining imagistic conceptions of thought perhaps, or some fruitful questions concerning the conditions of grasping a rule— one could read the most reputable journals in the profession and attend all of the main conferences bearing on the philosophy of mind and come away with the sense that Wittgenstein’s work has quite limited and dubious significance for this area of philosophy. There are some philosophers, however—in fact, some of the most respected in the world—who believe that Wittgenstein’s work constitutes one of the most significant contributions to philosophical questions about the mind in the history of philosophy, and who believe that despite the limited attention, sometimes even disdain, Wittgenstein’s work receives, it is largely of unrealized and untapped significance. This volume brings together some of the most influential figures in contemporary philosophy to discuss the significance of Wittgenstein’s philosophy for understanding the mind.