Wittgenstein and Religion: Fashionable Criticisms

Abstract

It may be that Wittgenstein’s influence on the philosophy of religion has aroused more hostility than any other aspect of his work. The years since the Second World War have been described as ‘a sorry time for the philosophy of religion in English-speaking countries’, and this, it is said, has been due not least to the disastrous influence of Wittgenstein.1 During the period referred to, the influence of Wittgenstein has been far-reaching in almost every branch of philosophy: philosophical logic, philosophy of mathematics, theory of knowledge, philosophy of mind, ethics, aesthetics, philo sophy of the social sciences, and so on. Adverse comments on his influence on the philosophy of religion, however, are not confined to those who think that Wittgenstein’s philosophical influence in general has been a disaster. On the contrary, they are made, as in the instance quoted, by sympathetic commen tators. Unfortunately, it cannot be denied that a philosophy by innuendo has grown up by which it is hinted, rather than argued, that what Wittgenstein is said to have said about religion and ritual is not closely related to the rest of his work. It has been suggested also that those influenced by him in the philosophy of religion have imposed alien features on Wittgenstein’s work, and made use of certain of his terms, such as ‘language-games’, in ways of which he would not have approved.