Wittgenstein and Natural Religion by Gordon Graham (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Wittgenstein and Natural Religion by Gordon Graham Peg O’Connor Gordon Graham. Wittgenstein and Natural Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. xiv + 219. Cloth, $55.00. Gordon Graham has an ambitious goal in this book, which is to revitalize philosophy of religion. While obviously interested in more contemporary debates about philosophical theology presently dominating contemporary philosophy of religion, Graham spins the dial back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Drawing from Henry Scougal, David Hume, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, Graham argues for the concept of “true religion.” Graham aims to “arrive at a philosophical understanding of religion as a human phenomenon” (xii). While Graham does make use of some contemporary authors in his argument, his inspiration and focus tend to the more historical. To begin to change the subject of philosophy of religion, Graham makes use of Wittgenstein. To some (many?) Wittgenstein may seem an odd choice as an ally in this endeavor. Graham readily admits this and sets himself the task of clearing the ground of what has passed for “Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion.” He wants no part of any of the various positions that have been ascribed to Wittgenstein or developed by others. He boldly claims that most of those positions are houses of cards. Instead of knocking those houses down in big swoops, Graham deftly plucks the bottom cards that allegedly function as their foundation. Those cards include the concepts of “forms of life,” “language-games,” and “world views.” Each of these concepts singularly and in combination have been interpreted and extended in unjustified ways. Graham’s reading of Wittgenstein is careful and nuanced, thereby making a compelling case that Wittgenstein and his views have been terribly misconstrued. Having cleared the ground, what does Graham want from Wittgenstein? He wants his mature and considered approach to philosophy. By explicating and adopting Wittgenstein’s “philosophy as therapy” approach, Graham aims to illuminate “the nature, place, and significance of religion in human life” (91). The key elements that Graham identifies in Wittgenstein’s approach include identifying captivating pictures, marshaling recollections/ assembling reminders for particular purposes, attending to differences, and for lack of a better expression, taking the edge off the craving for generality. Each of these serves the purpose of commanding a clear view, which is paramount for Wittgenstein. Most importantly, Graham uses Wittgenstein to highlight that humans are actors and agents in the world and not simply belief-formers and observers of the world around us. While we share many of the same senses with other animals, we humans have sensibilities. It is these sensibilities that distinguish humans from other animals. Having these sensibilities [End Page 792] makes us human and contributes to our flourishing. To demonstrate this, Graham draws from Wittgenstein’s discussions of musicality. Musicality is not merely the hearing of sounds or notes and chords. Musicality is the ability to understand and appreciate music in certain kinds of ways; one can see and hear aspects of a composition that the untrained cannot. A sensibility is always connected to being able to do something; a highly trained musician plays the piece differently from a competent musician. Graham readily admits that Wittgenstein never discusses anything like a religious sensibility. Is Graham guilty of the same unjustified over-extension of concepts that he has rightfully shown others to be? I admit to that worry even as I agree with Graham’s development of the concept of sensibility with its emphasis on acting. This concept is crucial for Graham’s reframing philosophy of religion to that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century concept of true religion. Armed with this concept of “religious sensibility,” it is appropriate to adopt Wittgenstein’s “look and see” approach to religious practices. Graham claims and so must demonstrate that religion is much more a way of being/ acting in the world than it is a system of speculative thought (151). Drawing from a wide range of philosophers from Schleiermacher to Mircea Eliade, Graham traverses an incredible amount of ground to reach the conclusion that religion’s most distinctive practice is worship, which ultimately can transform objects, values, and people into sacraments (176). The final chapter is perhaps the most provocative and certainly among the...