Without Reductionism

Abstract

My arguments against Polanyi’s notions of a layered ontology and dual control of entities were introduced in Margitay 2010 and defended against criticism in Margitay 2013. However, it has become clear from Lowney’s and earlier comments that my presentations were not sufficiently clear. So I will explicate some points of my argument against dual control. First, I will contrast the metaphysical thesis of The Causal Closure of the Physical with the semi-empirical thesis I hold, The Completeness of Physical Theories. I have argued that Polanyi’s theory of dual control involving downward determination is inconsistent with standard physics because of the completeness of physical theories. I support this claim by what I term the no difference and the completeness counterarguments. Secondly, I shall show these arguments do not involve or entail any sort of reductionism, and they do not question the ontological autonomy, the reality, and the irreducibility of higher level emergent entities and their properties. I thank Charles Lowney for his intriguing and detailed comments (in this issue which I will cite by page numbers in parentheses). They shed fresh light on many issues. The discussions by Lowney and other commentators in Tradition and Discovery (TAD 39:2) reveal a gross misunderstanding of my position. I discussed and criticized three of Polanyi’s arguments for a layered ontology (Margitay 2010, 2013): the argument from the Correspondence Thesis, from dual control, and from identification. All three have the objective of establishing a multilevel ontological hierarchy on the basis of the characteristics of our knowledge. My attack on dual control, however, elicited the fiercest response and greatest misunderstanding, so in this abbreviated reply to Lowney, I will focus on clarifying some points in this reasoning to dispel the charge of reductionism. I offered an internal criticism of Polanyi’s stance, not an external one from a reductionist point of view. Yet all my commentators except Kertesz (2013) interpreted my position as criticizing Polanyi from a reductionist-objectivist stance (Lowney, 25-26). I was astonished, for I accept neither scientific nor epistemological/ontological reductionism. I attributed this misunderstanding to the objectivist ontological language I adopted from Polanyi’s Correspondence Thesis. Thanks to Lowney’s thoughtful comments and to helpful personal discussions with Walter Gulick, Mihaly Heder, and Gergo Kertesz I now see this attribution was incomplete. The thesis of the completeness of physics is also responsible for the misunderstanding. Probably my critics attribute more ontological content, on the basis of the popular metaphysical notion of completeness, to my understanding of the completeness of physics than I intend. To answer Lowney’s comments regarding dual control (and space does not permit commenting on his other points) and to rectify misunderstandings, I will first distinguish two distinct notions of completeness. Second, I will recast my critique of Polanyi’s argument for dual control to show that my notion of completeness does not presuppose the metaphysical completeness principle or any sort of reductionism. Finally, the philosophical roots that generate the internal inconsistency in Polanyi’s argument will be pointed out.