Abstract
AbstractDespite increasing research into populist parties in power, their impact on subnational institutions has been neglected. Taking a novel multilevel perspective, this article inquires into the policy consequences of populist radical right parties (specifically, the FPÖ and Lega) in local government, and the effect of their simultaneous participation in national government. The article shows the expansion of exclusionary policy that follows their concurrent presence in national and local government. The process that leads from national government entry to local policy influence is traced using interview and newspaper data. The article argues that the influence of central parties over these ‘showcase’ localities is rooted in different multilevel governance configurations. These vary cross-nationally according to two factors: the strength of mayors’ linkages with higher government levels in the different institutional settings and, due to the different extent of party nationalization, the strategic value of the municipality to the central party.
Highlights
Despite increasing research into populist parties in power, their impact on subnational institutions has been neglected
While Austria and Italy offer a similar level of subnational autonomy (Hooghe et al 2010; Ladner et al 2016) and Party Significance Index (PSI) score (Egner et al 2018), they differ in the mayoral form: contrasting ‘executive mayors’ in Austria with ‘political mayors’ in Italy (Heinelt and Hlepas 2006)
What are the consequences of populist radical right (PRR) parties in local power? As this section shows, even before the entry of the FPÖ and Lega into national coalitions, their mayors in Wels and Cascina emphasized issue areas central to the party ideology in their agendas, and generated exclusionary policy outputs
Summary
Rather than analysing the consequences of populism in power through national policy, this article evaluates the consequences at the local level of government. While Austria and Italy offer a similar level of subnational autonomy (Hooghe et al 2010; Ladner et al 2016) and PSI score (Egner et al 2018), they differ in the mayoral form: contrasting ‘executive mayors’ in Austria with ‘political mayors’ in Italy (Heinelt and Hlepas 2006).7 While both are directly elected and considered the pre-eminent political leaders of the locality, ‘executive mayors’ are conceived to be working in an autonomous arena of policymaking, whereas ‘political mayors’ are more likely to utilize links with higher levels of government to effect policy change.
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