Abstract
Open-mindedness is consistently touted as one of the most important intellectual virtues. What is open-mindedness? Do we have an epistemic duty to be open-minded? This chapter will distinguish several ways of thinking about the concept of open-mindedness. On some conceptions, open-mindedness is not virtuous, so we do not have an obligation to be open-minded on those conceptions. There is, however, an important sense of open-mindedness that is virtuous. This chapter will argue that: (1) open-mindedness is a necessary condition for wisdom, (2) open-mindedness provides a way of grounding epistemic duty without any commitment to a deontological conception of epistemic justification or doxastic voluntarism, and (3) open-mindedness is a complementary and attractive alternative to the standard positions in the peer disagreement debate.
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