Wireless security techniques for coordinated manufacturing and on-line hardware trojan detection

Abstract

This paper addresses the hardware Trojan (HT) attacks that impose severe threats to the security and integrity of wireless networks and systems. We first develop HT attack models by embedding a single HT gate in the target design that triggers advanced malicious attacks. We place the one-gate HT trigger in such a way that it exhibits rare switching activities, consumes ultra-low leakage power, and hides from delay characterizations. Therefore, the HT attack models are capable of bypassing the widely used side channel-based HT detection schemes. Furthermore, based on the HT attack models, we investigate the potential on-line threat models during the system operation and develop an in-field trusted HT detection approach using physical unclonable functions (PUFs). We evaluate the effectiveness of the HT attack and defense models on a set of ISCAS'85, ISCAS'89, and ITC'99 benchmarks.