Abstract
This paper considers a two-way relay network, in which two sources exchange data through a relay and a cooperative jammer transmits an artificial noise (AN) while a number of nearby eavesdroppers overhear to recover data from both sources. The relay harvests energy from the two source signals and the AN, and then, uses this harvested energy to forward the received signals to the two sources. Each source eliminates its own signal from the relaying signal by self-cancellation and then decodes the data signal received from the other source. For this wireless-powered two-way relay system, we propose two secure relay protocols based on power splitting and time switching techniques. The two protocols are power splitting-based two-way relaying (PS-TWR) and time switching-based two-way relaying (TS-TWR), in which the relay, respectively, controls the power splitting ratio (p) and time switching ratio (α), in order to achieve a balance between the data receiving and the energy harvesting. The optimal values of p and α for each protocol are found analytically to maximize the minimum guaranteed secrecy capacity (C <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">S</sub> <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">min</sup> ) considering multiple eavesdroppers in high signal-to-noise ratio environments. Numerical results show that both the PS-TWR and TS-TWR protocols using the optimized values of p and α achieve the near-optimal C <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">S</sub> <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">min</sup> no matter how many eavesdroppers exist anywhere. Comparisons of the two protocols in various scenarios also show that PS-TWR achieves better C <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">S</sub> <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">min</sup> than TS-TWR because PS-TWR inherently has a shorter vulnerable time for eavesdropping than TS-TWR.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
