Wireless mesh selfish node: choice under uncertainty

Abstract

This paper gives a game theoretic view of selfish node in wireless mesh networks. We describe how various interactions in wireless mesh networks can be modeled as game. In current wireless networks a selfish node will not cooperate to provide services to other nodes unless it has an incentive to do so. Selfish node problem is of great interest because mobile nodes in wireless networks are often battery-powered and energy is a precious resource so that, to conserve energy, selfish nodes do not want to forward other nodes' packets. This fact considerably reduces wireless mesh network performance. Many researches have been done to solve the problem, but most of the researches focused on providing incentive or punishment that require trusted neighboring. To deal with this selfishness problem, we use choice under uncertainty theory and game theory to analyze the misbehavior of the selfish nodes and propose an incentive and efficacious solution which encourages wireless mesh nodes to fully cooperate.