Wir sind noch nie richtig Tier gewesen

Abstract

Abstract Mary Midgley belongs to a small group of most inspiring women philosophers of the 20th and early 21st century. Her impressive oeuvre, characterised by an exceptionally clear and witty style, combines contributions to such different fields of philosophical inquiry as moral philosophy, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of science in general and of biology in particular, as well as philosophy of religion. With her early article “The Concept of Beastliness”, we have something like a germ cell of her philosophy, introducing a range of concerns that will remain central to her work. The commentary focuses on five of them, traces how they show up in later works of Midgley’s, and suggests how they could inform philosophizing about humans and (other) animals today. These are, first, Midgley’s adherence to the concept of ‘human nature’. Second, her insistence that a comparative, ethologically informed perspective on humans and (other) animals helps to refute myths about both the (generically understood) animal and the human animal. Third, her alerting us to the fact that concepts of ‘human nature’ always influence our moral self-understanding. Fourth, her focus on the positive, open instincts in humans like caring, friendship, loyalty, or sociality that exist not only alongside but in a complex interplay with negative, open instincts such as aggression, and the idea that both classes of instincts can be shaped to some extent. And, finally, her focus on the conditions of social life that are important for people to be able to structure their lives in meaningful ways.