Abstract
In the present study, we examined the effect of wins and losses on impulsive action in gambling (Experiments 1–3) and nongambling tasks (Experiments 4–5). In each experiment, subjects performed a simple task in which they had to win points. On each trial, they had to choose between a gamble and a nongamble. The gamble was always associated with a higher amount but a lower probability of winning than the nongamble. After subjects indicated their choice (i.e., gamble or not), feedback was presented. They had to press a key to start the next trial. Experiments 1–3 showed that, compared to the nongambling baseline, subjects were faster to initiate the next trial after a gambled loss, indicating that losses can induce impulsive actions. In Experiments 4 and 5, subjects alternated between the gambling task and a neutral decision-making task in which they could not win or lose points. Subjects were faster in the neutral decision-making task if they had just lost in the gambling task, suggesting that losses have a general effect on action. Our results challenge the dominant idea that humans become more cautious after suboptimal outcomes. Instead, they indicate that losses in the context of potential rewards are emotional events that increase impulsivity.
Highlights
In the present study, we examined the effect of wins and losses on impulsive action in gambling (Experiments 1–3) and nongambling tasks (Experiments 4 –5)
People often slow down after they make an error (“posterror slowing”; Laming, 1968; Rabbitt & Phillips, 1967; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977). Such sequential effects have been observed in a variety of tasks, and are usually attributed to the cognitive control system: It monitors for errors (Alexander & Brown, 2010; Brown & Braver, 2005; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007), the occurrence of conflict between choice options
The main question we address below is whether gambling outcomes influenced impulsive action
Summary
We examined the effect of wins and losses on impulsive action in gambling (Experiments 1–3) and nongambling tasks (Experiments 4 –5). People often slow down after they make an error (“posterror slowing”; Laming, 1968; Rabbitt & Phillips, 1967; Rabbitt & Rodgers, 1977) Such sequential effects have been observed in a variety of tasks, and are usually attributed to the cognitive control system: It monitors for errors (Alexander & Brown, 2010; Brown & Braver, 2005; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007), the occurrence of conflict between choice options According to prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), the subjective value of an option can be influenced by immediately preceding gains and losses (Smith et al, 2009) This could explain why people gamble more after a loss than after a win, and attempt to recover previous losses
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