Abstract

ABSTRACT Regarding North Korea’s denuclearization and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula, South-North Korean dialogues used to be secondary to the United States (US) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea(DPRK) negotiations. There were frictions between the two. However, this situation changed on the road to the US-DPRK summits in Singapore on June 12, 2018, and in Hanoi on February 26, 2019. From the perspective of a “détente as a policy,” this paper will define the Moon Jae-in administration’s policy as a “Tight Link Strategy” and examine how South Korea was trying to connect the South-North Korean dialogue and the US-DPRK negotiations tightly. The “Tight Link Strategy” has two aspects: one is that it made a new way to a “Fourth Détente” on the Korean Peninsular. Through this strategy, President Moon Jae-in was able to cooperate with Chairman Kim Jong-un for an integrated policy to obtain concrete results on denuclearization and peace-building at the US-DPRK summit. The other aspect is that the “Tight Link Strategy” contained a risk: if US-DPRK negotiation stagnates, the progress in the South-North Korean dialogue will become difficult as well. This risk became a reality after the failure of the US-DPRK summit in Hanoi and caused the stagnation of South-North Korean relations. The Moon Jae-in administration will probably try to change its “Tight Link Strategy” policy. South Korea is now trying to expand its policy space toward North Korea by promoting individual tourism to North Korea, and the railway-road connection project between South and North Korea. At the same time, he will have to avoid possible friction with the United States for policy coordination toward North Korea and use a “Loose Link” between South-North Korean dialogues and US-DPRK negotiations.

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