Willing and able? A two-level theory on compliance with civil liberties in the EU

Abstract

ABSTRACT Although human rights treaties offer neither positive nor negative incentives, a majority of EU member states fully comply with civil liberties. This article seeks to identify the conditions able to clarify this paradox. Current EU compliance research struggles to provide a comprehensive explanation since (a) there is a lack of studies on practical implementation and (b) it rarely takes into account policy-specificity. The author suggests that a two-level theory based on capability and willingness is a useful approach for analyzing practical implementation when complemented with policy-specific conditions. Using fuzzy-set analysis, the author confirms that capability, namely judicial capability, executive capability or democratic experience, and willingness, namely a solid system of checks and balances, a strong civil society and an active participation in international organizations, are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for compliance with civil liberties and thereby substantiates the usefulness of the explanatory framework for further research.