Williama Rowe’a bayesiański argument ze zła przeciwko istnieniu Boga. Próba analizy i oceny.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present the Bayesian formulation of the argument from evil for atheism against the background of the contemporary debate on Rowe’s initial inductive formulation of the argument. At the beginning I present the key premises and basics of the Bayesian formulation (esp. Bayes’s theorem, the notion of epistemic probability, etc.), then I discuss the most important challenges to Rowe’s weak and strong claims. The main problem with the Bayesian formulation of the argument is that it does not accomplish what it was intended for: it fails to avoid the confrontation with skeptical theism . The latter has to be refuted in order to save Rowe’s argument (no matter which formulation we take into account, the inductive or the Bayesian). It seems that the debate on Rowe’s evidential argument from evil has reached a deadlock – more and more analytic philosophers of religion claim we should return to the logical formulation of the problem of evil.