Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines the significance of the principle of legality in the context of the phenomenon of willful ignorance (or blindness). It begins by describing the culpable state of willful ignorance. It contends that some (but not all) willfully ignorant defendants are liable despite their failure to satisfy the mens rea requirement of the statutes for which they are convicted. After considering whether the culpability of such defendants is equal to that of persons who act knowingly, the chapter discusses the limitations of proposed statutory solutions to the problem of willful ignorance. It concludes by defending an approach to this problem that the author contends is preferable to alternatives.
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