Abstract
According to our everyday concept, a morally attributable action has two prerequisites, namely the free decision between different options for action and the knowledge of what is being done, especially regarding the goal of action. During an intense debate on this topic at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century, William of Ockham takes into account this double requirement in his theory of action by understanding will and reason as partial causes of human activity. Thereby he asserts neither a voluntaristic intensification of the freedom of will, as he is often accused of doing so, nor a dominance of practical knowledge.
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