Will REDD+ Safeguards Mitigate Corruption? Qualitative Evidence from Southeast Asia

David Aled Williams,Kendra E Dupuy

doi:10.1080/00220388.2018.1510118

David Aled Williams, Kendra E Dupuy

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2018.1510118

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Abstract

High levels of faith and finance are being invested in REDD+ as a promising global climate change mitigation policy. Since its inception in 2007, corruption has been viewed as a potential impediment to the achievement of REDD+ goals, partly motivating ‘safeguards’ rolled out as part of national REDD+ readiness activities. We compare corruption mitigation measures adopted as part of REDD+ safeguards, drawing on qualitative case evidence from three Southeast Asian countries that have recently piloted the scheme: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. We find that while REDD+ safeguards adopt a conventional principal-agent approach to tackling corruption in the schemes, our case evidence confirms our theoretical expectation that REDD+ corruption risks are perceived to arise not only from principal-agent type problems: they are also linked to embedded pro-corruption social norms. This implies that REDD+ safeguards are likely to be at best partially effective against corruption, and at worst will not mitigate corruption at all.

Highlights

Mitigating the negative effects of climate change is an international policy goal.i Billions of dollars in public and private monies are financing programs aiming to reduce or prevent the sources of greenhouse gasses (Rosenberg et al 2014)
We find that while REDD+ safeguards adopt a conventional principal-agent approach to tackling corruption in the schemes, our case evidence confirms our theoretical expectation that REDD+ corruption risks are perceived to arise from principal-agent type problems: they are linked to embedded pro-corruption social norms
Drawing on evidence gathered through a set of structured qualitative case studies of three Southeast Asian countries to have piloted REDD+ (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam), we focus in particular on publicly financed REDD+ readiness activities in these three countries, since the majority of REDD+ financing to date comes from these sources (Norman and Nakhooda 2014)

Summary

Introduction

Mitigating the negative effects of climate change is an international policy goal.i Billions of dollars in public and private monies are financing programs aiming to reduce or prevent the sources of greenhouse gasses (Rosenberg et al 2014). In light of the corruption risks, seven safeguards for REDD+ were developed under the auspices of the UN-REDD Program, three of which relate to issues of governance, including corruption These are: (i) ensuring transparent and effective national forest governance structures, (ii) ensuring respect for the knowledge and rights of Indigenous Peoples and members of local communities, and (iii) ensuring full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders (UNREDD 2010). UN-REDD has established guidelines for Measurement, Reporting and Verification (MRV) of REDD+ activities, offering technical support and advice to countries in settingup their MRV systems, the precise nature of these systems remains the prerogative of national governments and a recent review notes progress may not be promising (Fischer et al 2016) These safeguards touch on standard concerns in public aid donors’ operational interventions for anticorruption, which have mostly adopted a principal-agent perspective for corruption’s existence (Marquette and Pfeiffer 2015). Undue influence to X continue activities that involve deforestation (bribery, nepotism, collusion)

Conclusion

Findings

What is the national context of forest governance and deforestation?