Will I tell you that you are smart (dumb)? Deceiving Others about their IQ or about a Random Draw

Abstract

We investigate whether individuals' deception rates differ by whether the messages they send to others are about the latter's relative ability or not. In doing so, we also study whether they are more likely to deceive when it is in their interest to make others believe that they are of either high ability or low ability. In the experiment, participants play a sender-receiver game. The experiment features a 2x2 factorial design. First, we vary whether the state is determined by the receiver's relative performance in an IQ test or it is about a randomly drawn number. Second, monetary incentives, which are common knowledge, are such that the sender is better off (worse off) when the receiver's action is about him being of high (low) relative ability, while the receiver benefits from selecting the action that matches his true ability. We find that senders' lying rates do not significantly differ across the experimental treatments. Our results suggest that the psychological costs related to sending positive, neutral, or negative ego-relevant information are not strong enough to lead to differences in lying rates.