Will and Reason: A Critical Analysis of Kant's Concepts

Abstract

We start our exploration by pointing to the everyday usage of the two concepts will and reason in order to identify the systematic transformation these concepts underwent in Kant's system. It has to be observed that even in our everyday interpretation and parlance there are different meanings or nuances of meanings attributed to the phenomenon of will and perhaps also to a lesser extent to the phenomenon of the intellect and reason. Will is generally and usually understood as an active attitude of human beings towards the surrounding world or towards the ends of their desires or aspirations. That active attitude is interpreted as an attitude and indeed we say willingness, implying already the presence of will to do something, to interfere or intervene in the surrounding world or to accomplish a deed or a series of deeds in order to achieve the end. Once the aspect of an end is implied in the attitude of will, we bring in an additional component, that is to say that of a conscious intentional action brought -about by will. In this sense will is not only a power or an active intention; inherent in it is the aspect of decision or resolving decision and the component of decision is already imbued with a certain direction. Hence we find even in our everyday usage of the concept of will and pari pass in our understanding of the phenomenon of will a combination of several aspects; a) that of power or faculty; b) that of leading from that power to the act performed and grounded in that power; and c) that of an awareness of what is intended to be achieved by that power. Yet we can take a step further in terms of the articulation of the nuance of awareness which is inherent in the phenomenon of will. We affirm the end to be achieved both in terms of our direction towards the environment as well as in the direction towards the end. The affirmation in this sense is inherent in will and, strange as it may sound, in the monotheistic tradition