WILHELM DILTHEY ON THE OBJECTIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE IN HUMAN SCIENCES

Abstract

1. Introduction As a philosopher of science, Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) focused on human sciences or Geisteswissenschaften, a term that had gained currency in German culture. These sciences underwent a so-called crisis of foundations (Grundlagenkrise) (Lessing 1984:132-136) during Dilthey's formative years in second half of nineteenth century. In Germany, human sciences had evolved into sciences mainly within framework of concept of scientificalness (Wissenschaftlichkeit) of German Idealism. However, during first half of nineteenth century human sciences had developed into empirical research sciences, which made it impossible for them to understand their own nature by means of concept of scientificalness that had formed basis for their development into academic disciplines (Schnadelbach 1991:108-117). On other hand, a sound methodological research apparatus had been elaborated over years within various human science disciplines, to which they could resort in their ambitions to offer genuinely scientific knowledge of areas that until then had been studied basically from metaphysical point of view of German Idealism. In these circumstances, Dilthey saw a new role for philosophy, status of which as an academic discipline had become somewhat unstable in post-metaphysical era. This role consisted in providing existing research methodology of contemporary human sciences with philosophical-epistemological foundation that it still lacked. As a negative consequence of above-mentioned lack, he points out groundlessness of validity pretensions of knowledge as human sciences view it, which undermines their inherent aspiration to provide rules for optimal management of social life. It is especially characteristic of Dilthey's reasoning that solution of these two tasks coincides, as he sees it: very substantiation of objectivity of research results of human sciences would guarantee ability of these sciences to react back on life and society (Dilthey 2002:159). Thus we could say that Dilthey's deliberations of objectivity of scientific knowledge are motivated by two aspirations. On one hand, to form an adequate self-understanding for human sciences of themselves as legitimate members of scientific community. On other hand, to motivate pretensions of human sciences to become instrument of consciously shaping social life. In its endeavours to elaborate epistemology of scientific knowledge, German philosophy relied on national tradition, especially on philosophical legacy of Immanuel Kant. Back to became catchword for a number of diverse philosophical quests in second half of nineteenth century in Germany. Dilthey, too, was influenced by this movement, as very ambitious name that he gave to his epistemological aspirations testifies. Thus he set out to create the critique of historical reason, i.e. to complete in philosophy of human sciences something analogous to what he thought Kant had achieved within framework of his critique of reason in elaborating epistemological foundations of natural sciences. In accordance with general Kantian views, Dilthey proceeds in his philosophy from analysis of consciousness, attributing a major role to synthetic activeness of human spirit in formation of human world view, just like Kant had done before him. Likewise, he adopts in general lines Kant's idea of objectivity of scientific knowledge, according to which latter consists in strictly general and inevitable validity of knowledge about experienced reality. In Dilthey's opinion, Kant had managed to present convincingly conditions of possibility of objectivity of cognition in natural sciences. At same time he was positive that it was not possible to treat cognition in human sciences in an adequate manner by proceeding from conditions that Kant had delineated in area of natural sciences. …