Wie viel und welche (De-)Regulierung braucht die Energiewirtschaft in Deutschland?

Abstract

Abstract Gerhard Jochum and Wolfgang Pfaffenberger state that regulation sometimes is used as an euphemism for ad hoc interventions into the free play of the market. In the network based energy industries only the network should be regulated as far as it constitutes a bottleneck. The idea should be to promote competition rather than to determine (short term) results of the market. To create a specific regulatory body for Germany based on a detailed regulatory framework in the longer run may prove to result in less rather than more competition in the industry if we look at the dynamic aspects of competition. It would be much better to rely on the long and general experience with the concept of misuse of market power rather than to create a specific system of regulation for the energy industries. Regarding environmental regulation the present multiregulation based on taxation, special feed in tariffs plus the new CO2 certificate trading scheme needs to be reorganised in order to avoid inconsistencies. Werner Brinker points out that to ensure reliable network operation in spite of increasing input of renewables-based electricity, mainly due to the increased construction of new wind energy plants, large-scale network development measures requiring high economic costs will be necessary during the next years. At the same time, the amendment of the German Energy Industry Act provides for a regulation of network access. Discussions on the details of this regulation are still going on. The author requires that the government concentrates on setting up a calculable legal framework which guarantees fair network access and economically efficient network operation. This is the only possible way to enable long-term investment decisions in order to guarantee a reliable supply in the future. Dieter Schmitt contributes that five years after the liberalisation of its electricity and gas markets Germany now has no choice but also to substitute the hitherto preferred negotiated by regulated third party access. This requires a profound amendment of the German energy law, last not least because finally it was decided to introduce a sector specific regulatory authority with own rules and procedures. The proposed regulation of the electricity and gas grids - meanwhile presented to the Parliament - has fundamentally been criticised regarding not only the procedure but also specific details of the planned “ex post” - cost- as well as “price cap” - regulation and the authorities to be involved. The author analyses the arguments in detail, finally resulting that neither “cost”- nor “price cap”-regulation could be recommended with respect to huge problems remaining open and that only the immediate development and introduction of incentive regulation, i.e. the explicit use of market forces for regulatory purposes will ensure permanent efficiency gains in this field. Finally the paper argues that sector specific regulation of access to the grid in any case has to be supplemented by misuse of market power regulation, but which continuously has to be adjusted to the profoundly changing environment of the electricity and gas sectors.