WiAdv

Abstract

WiFi-based gesture recognition systems have attracted enormous interest owing to the non-intrusive of WiFi signals and the wide adoption of WiFi for communication. Despite boosted performance via integrating advanced deep neural network (DNN) classifiers, there lacks sufficient investigation on their security vulnerabilities, which are rooted in the open nature of the wireless medium and the inherent defects (e.g., adversarial attacks) of classifiers. To fill this gap, we aim to study adversarial attacks to DNN-powered WiFi-based gesture recognition to encourage proper countermeasures. We design WiAdv to construct physically realizable adversarial examples to fool these systems. WiAdv features a signal synthesis scheme to craft adversarial signals with desired motion features based on the fundamental principle of WiFi-based gesture recognition, and a black-box attack scheme to handle the inconsistency between the perturbation space and the input space of the classifier caused by the in-between non-differentiable processing modules. We realize and evaluate our attack strategies against a representative state-of-the-art system, Widar3.0 in realistic settings. The experimental results show that the adversarial wireless signals generated by WiAdv achieve over 70% attack success rate on average, and remain robust and effective across different physical settings. Our attack case study and analysis reveal the vulnerability of WiFi-based gesture recognition systems, and we hope WiAdv could help promote the improvement of the relevant systems.