Why we don\u2019t always punish: Preferences for non-punitive responses to moral violations

Joseph Heffner,Oriel Feldmanhall

doi:10.1038/s41598-019-49680-2

Joseph Heffner, Oriel Feldmanhall

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-019-49680-2

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Abstract

While decades of research demonstrate that people punish unfair treatment, recent work illustrates that alternative, non-punitive responses may also be preferred. Across five studies (N = 1,010) we examine non-punitive methods for restoring justice. We find that in the wake of a fairness violation, compensation is preferred to punishment, and once maximal compensation is available, punishment is no longer the favored response. Furthermore, compensating the victim—as a method for restoring justice—also generalizes to judgments of more severe crimes: participants allocate more compensation to the victim as perceived severity of the crime increases. Why might someone refrain from punishing a perpetrator? We investigate one possible explanation, finding that punishment acts as a conduit for different moral signals depending on the social context in which it arises. When choosing partners for social exchange, there are stronger preferences for those who previously punished as third-party observers but not those who punished as victims. This is in part because third-parties are perceived as relatively more moral when they punish, while victims are not. Together, these findings demonstrate that non-punitive alternatives can act as effective avenues for restoring justice, while also highlighting that moral reputation hinges on whether punishment is enacted by victims or third-parties.

Highlights

While decades of research demonstrate that people punish unfair treatment, recent work illustrates that alternative, non-punitive responses may be preferred
Once maximal compensation is available, the endorsement of punishment drops by almost 50 percentage points (Fig. 1b)
Because it is unknown whether compensation judgments would have a similar effect size as punishment, we used a conservative medium effect size[41] (Cohen’s d = 0.50;) which suggested that a sample size of N = 36 is sufficient to observe an effect of moral severity on compensation judgments with 90% power (α = 0.05)

Summary

Introduction

While decades of research demonstrate that people punish unfair treatment, recent work illustrates that alternative, non-punitive responses may be preferred. More recent work reveals that if non-punitive alternatives are made available, punishment is not always systemically endorsed[3,4,5] This suggests that preferences for punishment may be limited, perhaps to contexts where it is the only available option for restoring justice. The desirability of punishment has been questioned[6,7,8], it remains unclear what features of a moral transgression motivate a punitive versus non-punitive response We explore this question, investigating when—and why—punishment is preferred as an instrument for restoring justice. In other cases, perceived unjustified punishment leads individuals to retaliate with retributive behavior, and this cycle of retribution collectively reduces the welfare of the group[14,15] These findings together suggest that punishment may have mixed desirability depending on the context, and may not be a uniformly preferred method for restoring justice. Www.nature.com/scientificreports results suggest that, depending on the context, non-punitive measures may be viable alternatives, the boundary conditions (i.e., is there a tipping point for how much compensation is required before punishment is no longer desired?) remain unknown

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