WHY UPLOADING WILL NOT WORK, OR, THE GHOSTS HAUNTING TRANSHUMANISM

Abstract

Transhumanists tend to have a commitment to materialism and naturalism but nonetheless pursue goals traditionally associated with religious ideologies, such as the quest for immortality. Some hope to achieve immortality through the application of a technology whereby the brain is scanned and the person uploaded to a computer. This process is typically described as transferring one's mind to a computer. I argue that, while the technology may be feasible, uploading will not succeed because it in fact does not a mind at all and will not preserve personal identity. Transhumanist hopes for such transfer ironically rely on treating the mind dualistically — and inconsistently with materialism — as the functional equivalent of a soul, as is evidenced by a carefully examination of the language used to describe and defend uploading. In this sense, transhumanist thought unwittingly contains remnants of dualistic and religious concepts.