Abstract
After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in possession of the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal. By 1994, Ukraine had surrendered its entire nuclear arsenal to its historical enemy, Russia. This phenomenon has largely escaped scrutiny. At a time in world history when the question of nuclear proliferation and disarmament has again come to the forefront of international politics, it is important to reexamine the case of Ukrainian disarmament in which standard paradigms of international relations fail to satisfactorily explain historical events. Only by applying the underutilized individual level of analysis can Ukrainian disarmament be clearly understood.
Highlights
Ukraine inherited a nuclear arsenal in 1991, but a new strategic threat: Russia
At a time in world history when the question of nuclear proliferation and disarmament has again come to the forefront of international politics, it is important to reexamine the case of Ukrainian disarmament in which standard paradigms of international relations fail to satisfactorily explain historical events
On May 22, 1992, the leaders of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a document known as the “Lisbon Protocol,” which established the new nuclear states as signatories to the START treaty and committed them to joining the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear states by the time of the treaty’s renewal in 1995.5 Both of these measures still had to be ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament
Summary
Ukraine inherited a nuclear arsenal in 1991, but a new strategic threat: Russia. Ukraine’s new nuclear arsenal seemed to be the only effective hedge against the threat posed by its the militarily superior neighbor. Despite the real threat from Russia and the deterrent that nuclear weapons provided, Ukraine gave up its strategic nuclear arsenal to Russia in 1994.2 Why did Ukraine choose to act in such strategically disadvantageous manner?. Contrary to realist and domestic organizational paradigms, I maintain that the significant cause behind Ukraine’s policy was the ranking of economic and strategic priorities by its two dominant political actors, Leonid Kuchma and Leonid Kravchuk. I challenge the realist perspective by demonstrating the robustness of nuclear deterrent and the existence of a real threat. The final section addresses organizational and individual domestic causes of disarmament
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