Why \u2018believes\u2019 is not a vague predicate

Sophie Archer

doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0993-3

Abstract

According to what I call the ‘Vagueness Thesis’ (‘VT’) about belief, ‘believes’ is a vague predicate. On this view, our concept of belief admits of borderline cases: one can ‘half-believe’ something (Price in Belief, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1969) or be ‘in-between believing’ it (Schwitzgebel in Philos Q 51:76–82, 2001, Noûs 36:249–275, 2002, Pac Philos Q 91:531–553, 2010). In this article, I argue that VT is false and present an alternative picture of belief. I begin by considering a case—held up as a central example of vague belief—in which someone sincerely claims something to be true and yet behaves in a variety of other ways as if she believes that it is not. I argue that, even from the third-person perspective prioritised by proponents of VT, the case does not motivate VT. I present an alternative understanding of the case according to which the person in question believes as they say they do yet also has a belief-discordant implicit attitude otherwise. Moreover, I argue that, independently of the interpretation of any particular case, VT fails to accommodate the first-person perspective on belief. Belief is not only an item of one’s psychology that helps explain one’s behaviour; it is what one takes to be true. This fact about belief manifests itself in the nature of deliberation concerning whether to believe something and that of introspection regarding whether one believes something. Attending to these phenomena reveals that VT is not merely unmotivated, but untenable.

Highlights

The transparency of deliberation concerning whether to believe that p is a fact about what is psychologically possible in an aspect of our doxastic lives that needs accommodating by any satisfactory picture of belief
The problem for VT is that this transparency is a necessary constraint on beliefs formed via deliberation concerning whether to believe that p
According to VT, it should be possible for someone who satisfies all of the other envisaged criteria for holding a certain belief, let’s say, to form a belief via deliberation concerning whether to believe that p that is not transparent

Summary

Introduction

There is an explanation as to why they are not actualised They are not actualised because in addition to Juliet’s belief that the races are intellectually equal she possesses a beliefdiscordant implicit attitude that blocks her dispositions to behave as if she believes that the races are intellectually equal when not reflecting upon the question at hand. Most of her unreflective behaviour is as if she is positively of the view that the races are not intellectually equal This is the pattern in Juliet’s behaviour that the claim that it is vague whether or not Juliet believes that the races are intellectually equal does not help us capture. The belief-implicit attitude picture provides us with an explanation as to how Juliet can behave as she does that is consistent with her believing that the races are intellectually equal simpliciter. Cases involving self-deception seem better explicable in terms of several, interacting states such as anxiety and suspicion, for example, as opposed to vague belief.

VT from the first-person perspective

Conclusion