Why the U.S. Military Lost Afghanistan

Abstract

Why did Afghanistan falter as a U.S. partner? America’s war in Afghanistan was lost for many reasons, but the U.S. military contributed to its downfall in two ways. First, U.S. combat units, trained to fight conventional battles, conducted counterterrorism operations (aka “search and destroy” missions) against guerilla forces that resulted in hardening the resolve of the enemy while causing widespread and senseless civilian casualties. Second, the Afghan military could not exist without U.S. logistical and material support. Because the Afghan Army was trained and equipped to fight a conventional-type war, they were incapable of operating independent of U.S. support, and could not survive on their own against guerrilla forces in a protracted civil war. Therefore, the Afghan security forces were not properly trained and equipped, demonstrating that the U.S. military repeated mistakes of the Vietnam War. It is argued that the United States must temper its conventional warfare mindset and re-direct resources toward improved ways to conduct limited wars against irregular adversaries. The constabulary forces concept described by Morris Janowitz is a feasible way to improve the chances that U.S. forces will succeed in such limited wars.