Abstract
I should like in this paper to explain and defend a theory of essentialism that I have briefly set out elsewhere.' In particular, I would like to show that (a) it is based upon a simple distinction that we can often employ without any difficulty, (b) it is open to none of the standard objections to essentialism, and (c) it recognizes as essential significant properties of particular physical objects, most importantly, the ones that correspond to the intuitively appropriate Aristotelian secondary substances. If all of this can be done, then there will be no reason to offer, as recent defenders of essentialism like Kaplan and Plantinga have, some de dicto reinterpretation of essentialist claims. This is fortunate, for the theory in question does not seem to lend itself to such reinterpretations. In short, then, I will be arguing for an unabashed traditional theory of Aristotelian essentialism.
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