Why Proper Names are Rigid Designators

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the rigidity of proper names can be explained by appealing to a more fundamental semantic feature which I refer to as their arbitrariness. I assume and do not try to show that proper names are rigid designators. My purpose, rather, is to establish a connection between their arbitrariness and rigidity which, even though contingent, shows that rigidity is a far less accidental feature of names than it might otherwise appear. Sections I and II of the paper are brief discussions of the notions of arbitrariness and rigidity respectively. In section III I begin by saying why it seems that these two features of names must be connected, and then proceed to identify the link between them by means of a fairly detailed argument. My final section, IV, is a response to the objection that my argument does not do justice to the important distinction between a name and a use of a name to denote a particular thing. I would like to stress at the outset that this paper does not aim to convert those who deny that proper names are rigid designators, or to answer their objections to this thesis. In my view these objections are answerable, but that is another topic. It is also worth emphasizing that the paper operates within the framework of the causal approach to name reference. Although my arguments for the arbitrariness of proper names go against many versions of descriptivism, there are no doubt some sophisticated versions of descriptivism which escape them. The diehard descriptivist will not accept my explanation of rigidity, but I hope that he will view it as a contribution towards the detailed articulation of the only significant rival to his approach. There is one further preliminary issue I would like to address: Isn't it just obvious to most people who accept the causal approach and who think that proper names are rigid designators that their rigidity is due to their arbitrariness? My answer is that it is prefectly natural to think this, and I claim no originality for the thought. But thinking a thought is one