Why Powerful States Don’t Go It Alone

Abstract

Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War. By Sarah E. Kreps. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 223 pp., $27.95 paperback (ISBN-13: 978-0-19-975380-2). Military coalitions have long been prevalent in interstate conflicts. However, to date, there is scant research on the politics of coalitions. Coalitions of Convenience seeks to expand our understanding of coalition formation by exploring when states that could fight alone seek to form coalitions and what type of coalition will form under varying conditions. Using the nature of the threat faced by a state and the time horizon for dealing with the threat, Kreps creates a tight and parsimonious theory for explaining both coalition formation and structure. The central debate in the book is between power and norms. Do states form coalitions based upon power calculations or do states choose multilateralism because of norms against unilateralism? In the end, the theoretical argument is a blending of the two, with more emphasis placed upon power. Kreps argues that states always prefer higher levels of legitimacy associated with operating multilaterally. However, a desire to preserve power drives this aspiration for greater legitimacy. States seek legitimacy as normative theories predict; but the motivation for this action is power and not a concern with following norms. This realist correction to normative arguments is an important contribution of this book and is sure to stimulate further debate. Part of the motivation for the theory …