Abstract
This paper articulates a careful and detailed objection to the moral permissibility of postnatal abortion. Giubilini and Minerva (2012) claim that if being unable to nurture one's newborn child without significant burdens to oneself, family or society, is a proper moral ground for the demand that the life of a fetus be terminated, then 'after-birth abortion should be considered a permissible option for women who would be damaged by [rearing the child or] giving up their newborns for adoption.' It will be shown that the permissibility of postnatal abortion does not follow from the argument's premises, in particular, the premise that the newborn is not a person in the morally relevant sense.
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