Why People with More Emotion Regulation Difficulties Made a More Deontological Judgment: The Role of Deontological Inclinations.

Lisong Zhang,Xiaoyuan Wu,Zhongquan Li,Ziyuan Zhang

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02095

Lisong Zhang, Xiaoyuan Wu + Show 2 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02095

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Abstract

Previous studies have demonstrated the key role of emotion in moral judgment, and explored the relationship between emotion regulation and moral judgment. The present study investigated the influence of individual differences in emotion regulation difficulties on moral judgment. Study 1 examined whether individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties made a more deontological judgment. Study 2 explored the underlying mechanism using a process-dissociation approach, examining whether deontological inclinations and utilitarian inclinations separately or jointly accounted for the association. The results indicated that individuals with high emotion regulation difficulties rated the utilitarian actions less morally appropriate, and one’s deontological inclinations mediated the association between emotion regulation difficulties and moral judgment.

Highlights

Moral judgment involves an evaluation of one’s or others’ actions on moral acceptability (Avramova and Inbar, 2013; Szekely and Miu, 2015a)
We focused on the relationship between emotion regulation difficulties and moral judgment
The results revealed that individuals with more emotion regulation difficulties rated the utilitarian actions less morally appropriate

Summary

Introduction

Moral judgment involves an evaluation of one’s or others’ actions on moral acceptability (Avramova and Inbar, 2013; Szekely and Miu, 2015a). Participants face two options: to hit a switch to divert the trolley to another track, and to save the five workmen at the cost of the death of one workman on that track, or to do nothing, and to let the trolley cause the deaths of the five workmen (Greene et al, 2004) The preference for the former is regarded as a utilitarian judgment (Mill, 1861/1998), judging mainly on the basis of the consequences of the actions (Elqayam et al, 2017), and the preference for the latter is interpreted as a deontological judgment (Kant, 1785/1959), judging mainly on the basis of pre-existing obligations (Elqayam et al, 2017). Empirical evidence suggests that deontological judgment will be made if the negative emotion experienced during moral dilemmas is powerful enough, or the

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