Abstract
Grofman et al. (forthcoming) find thatparty leaders in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives tend to be more extremethan the median member of their party, andthat they tend to come from the party'sideological ``heartland'' between the medianand the mode. This paper shows that if thedistribution of preferences is skewed (asis the case with both parties in theHouse), then we should expect sequentialelimination elections to choose on averageleaders between the median and modalpositions. We show that this is the casewhether or not the party is factionalized.
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