Why pan-dispositionalism is incompatible with metaphysical naturalism

Abstract

Pan-dispositionalism is one of the major theories in current analytic metaphysics concerning dispositional properties (i.e., causal powers / capacities / abilities) and how they relate to categorical properties (i.e., non-dispositional properties, paradigm cases of which include shape, size, structure etc.). According to pan-dispositionalists, all fundamental properties are dispositional in nature, such that any supposed categorical properties are either unreal or reducible in some way to the dispositional. I argue that if pan-dispositionalism is true then metaphysical naturalism (roughly the view that the only objects in existence are physical objects) is false. To the extent that one finds pan-dispositionalism a plausible theory, one ought to question the truth of metaphysical naturalism. On the other hand, if one is a committed metaphysical naturalist, one ought to question the truth of pan-dispositionalism. Either way we get a significant result, of interest both to those working in metaphysics and to those working in philosophy of religion.