Abstract
The interpretation of Ockham's mental-speech assumption (AMS) as an ideal language in some Fregean sense was seriously challenged by Panaccio and others who attempted to show that mental speech is not entirely devoid of equivocation and synonymy. This chapter discusses Fodor's Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH) in more detail. The structural differences between Ockham's and Fodor's conceptions become apparent on the level of propositional attitudes. The LOTH which appeared in 1975 was to provide an alternative to the behaviourist model of the mind that dominated the discussion both in philosophy and psychology at that time. Fodor turns to those entities such as beliefs and desires in order to explain action or behaviour where these unobservable entities are not conceived as irreducibly mental. As Fodor notes, people usually explain the actions of their fellow-creatures by ascribing propositional attitudes to them.Keywords: Fodor; Language of Thought Hypothesis (LOTH); Ockham's mental-speech assumption (AMS); philosophy; psychology
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