Why Normative Behaviourism Fails

Abstract

Starting from Jonathan Floyd’s contrast between ‘mentalism’ and ‘behaviourism’, I argue that, in general, we cannot make sense of a person’s behaviour without also understanding the thinking behind it. Floyd claims that ‘mentalist’ political philosophy is undercut by inconsistency and disagreement in people’s political judgements, but the evidence suggests otherwise. The public does not divide up into rival camps as philosophers do, but instead are mostly value pluralists. Conversely, it is unclear what justificatory role is played by the kinds of observed behaviour – insurrection and crime – singled out by Floyd. Failure to resist a political system cannot tell us whether people endorse the principles it embodies. So the system Floyd wishes to defend – ‘social-liberal-democracy’ – cannot be vindicated as ‘the people’s choice’ simply by producing evidence that it provokes less resistance than alternative systems, past and present.