Abstract
This chapter focuses on the task of picking a conception of tropes among the three main rival trope theories, including Campbell’s well-known trope theory, Natural Class Trope Nominalism and Resemblance Trope Theory. It is argued that the tropes of Natural Class Trope Nominalism are superior to Campbellian tropes. Campbellian tropes collapse into exemplifications of universals or into one of the alternate conceptions of tropes. It is, then, argued that Natural Class Trope Nominalism is superior to Resemblance Trope Nominalism with respect to the tasks of accounting for property–property resemblance and explaining the logical characteristics of resemblance. At the end of the chapter, responses are offered to the following two “collapse” objections directed against Natural Class Tropes: (a) Natural Class Tropes are indistinguishable from bare particulars, and (b) Natural Class Tropes are indistinguishable from objects.
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