Why Military Regimes Fail: The Perils of Transition

Abstract

This article argues that in industrializing democratic (or semidemocratic) societies, where military interventions have been viewed as solutions to increasingly complex economic and political problems, the return to civilian rule is a frustrating experience for the military leaders. Even under the best of circumstances-when soldiers withdraw willingly-the transition process rarely produces the results desired by the military. The shortcomings of the transition are imbedded in the dynamics of the process, which include the officers' own miscalculations and, more importantly, civilians' need to demonstrate independence and resistance. This article demonstrates the perils of transition in the case of post-1980 Turkey, where the military undertook a well-planned and thought-out process of disengagement under very favorable conditions. There was almost no civilmilitary conflict or opposition from external sources. Yet the final outcome disappointed the generals.