Abstract

AbstractAccording to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer. This article argues that the AAMD is unsound. I begin by introducing the “natural dysfunction analysis” of disorder, before outlining the AAMD. I then analyze the necessary conditions for realizer autonomous dysfunction. Building on this, I show that software functions disassociate from hardware functions in a way that mental functions do not disassociate from brain functions. It follows that mental disorders are brain disorders necessarily.

Highlights

  • According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer

  • This paper argues that the AAMD is unsound

  • Because the selection histories which give rise to the functions of software-hardware are distinct and separable, the functions of software-hardware are separable. This is what provides for the possibility of software problems in the absence of hardware problems or ‘autonomous software dysfunction’

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Summary

Introduction

According to the Argument for Autonomous Mental Disorder (AAMD), mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain disorder, just as software problems can occur in the absence of hardware problems in a computer. The argument from the computer analogy establishes that real, scientifically respectable mental disorder can occur in the absence of brain dysfunction, and that this is compatible with physicalism and with our best philosophical theories of disorder. This kind of view features prominently in the scientific and biomedical discourse. Because some software functions are not selected effects of the hardware, autonomous software dysfunction is possible. All mental functions are necessarily selected effects of the brain This is the crucial disanalogy between software-hardware and mind-brain.

The Natural Dysfunction Analysis
Wakefield
Papineau
What is it to be a dysfunction of X?
How is autonomous software dysfunction possible?
Why is there ‘functional separability’ in hardware-software?
Does functional separability obtain in the case of mind-brain?
Objections
What about ontogenetically selected effects?
What about multiply realised mental dysfunctions?
What of those who subscribe to a different theory of mental disorder?
Concluding Remarks

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