Why Majority Rule Cannot Be Based only on Procedural Equality

Abstract

Sadurski (2008) takes the value of political equality for granted and seeks to show how majority rule follows. He proceeds by first resolving two apparent puzzles—the insensitivity of majority rule to the intensity of preferences and the relationship between majority rule and unanimity requirements. He then shows how political equality is compatible with unequal outcomes, through a discussion and criticism of Dworkin’s (2000) dependent conception of democracy. Dworkin points out that equality of impact (personal voting power) is impossible if applied to citizens and their representatives, yet too modest if applied only to different citizens. On the other hand, he also rejects equality of influence, since while some sources of influence are illegitimate (e.g., wealth) others are part of a well-functioning democratic process (e.g., persuasion). Unable to find an independent specification of political equality, Dworkin endorses a dependent conception of democracy that focuses on substantively equal outcomes. Dworkin presumably finds this position attractive because it allows him to say that, when Supreme Court Justices strike down majoritarian legislation in the name of equality, their action is democratic rather than undemocratic (Dworkin 2000, 208–9). Sadurski criticizes Dworkin for failing to maintain political equality as a distinct sphere of equality. Taken to its limit, it would seem that we could dispense with the rule of the people altogether, if a panel of benevolent