Why kin and group selection models may not be enough to explain human other-regarding behaviour

Abstract

Models of kin or group selection usually feature only one possible fitness transfer. The phenotypes are either to make this transfer or not to make it and for any given fitness transfer, Hamilton's rule predicts which of the two phenotypes will spread. In this article we allow for the possibility that different individuals or different generations face similar, but not necessarily identical possibilities for fitness transfers. In this setting, phenotypes are preference relations, which concisely specify behaviour for a range of possible fitness transfers (rather than being a specification for only one particular situation an animal or human can be in). For this more general set-up, we find that only preference relations that are linear in fitnesses can be explained using models of kin selection and that the same applies to a large class of group selection models. This provides a new implication of hierarchical selection models that could in principle falsify them, even if relatedness—or a parameter for assortativeness—is unknown. The empirical evidence for humans suggests that hierarchical selection models alone are not enough to explain their other-regarding or altruistic behaviour.