Why it would be strategically rational for Russia to escalate in Kaliningrad and the Suwalki corridor

Abstract

Russian escalation activities related to the Suwalki corridor and wider Baltic security make a good case for demonstrating how theoretical models could help in terms of damage control in complicated security situations. This is especially true regarding how seemingly rational and morally impeccable options may eventually lead to a painful and costly security dilemma in which the available options become both too costly and publicly unacceptable. In order to grasp the inner workings of the “escalate-to-de-escalate” brinkmanship, the current study analyzes this phenomenon through the lens of the game theory model, “dollar auction,” and a concept of securitization. The aim of the study is to analyze which factors either hinder or support the escalation of tensions between Russia and the NATO Alliance in Kaliningrad and in the Suwalki corridor, and to discuss how far the potential conflict could go should it break out in the future.